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Environmental, transportation, occupational, and other regulations that reduce fatality risk are 
frequently evaluated using benefit-cost analysis (BCA). We examine how risk reductions are valued 
under BCA, utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs. The social value of risk reduction (SVRR) to an individual 
is the rate of increase of social welfare for a small decrease to the individual’s current-period fatality 
risk. Under BCA, the SVRR is the individual’s value per statistical life (VSL), which is increasing in 
wealth and baseline risk. Under utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs, the SVRR is far less sensitive to 
income; it can decrease with income for prioritarian SWFs that exhibit sufficient inequality aversion. 
The SVRR increases with or is independent of baseline risk. Like VSL, it can increase or decrease with 
age, but prioritarian SWFs assign larger SVRR to younger relative to older individuals than does the 
utilitarian SWF. Extensions to catastrophe aversion and nonfatal health risks are discussed. 
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Many forms of government regulation are designed to decrease risks of death from particular 
hazards, leading to increases in life expectancy. In some cases, reducing risks of death (and of 
nonfatal illness or injury) is the primary objective (as in food, transportation, and occupational 
safety); in other cases, reducing health risks is but one of several objectives (as in much of 
environmental regulation). Even when it is not the sole objective, reduction of fatality risks can 
dominate the quantified benefits. For example, estimates of the benefits of the U.S. 1990 Clean Air 
Act amendments find that 85 to 95 percent of the quantified annual benefit is due to the reduction in 
mortality risk (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2011, Table 7-1). Lee and Taylor (2019) estimate 
that reductions in mortality risk account for up to 70 percent of the quantified benefits of recent 
major U.S. federal regulations. In part this dominance reflects the much greater value estimated for 
reducing fatal rather than nonfatal health risks. It also reflects the fact that many nonfatal health 
effects and environmental consequences are not included in the evaluation because monetary values 
have not been estimated for many of these numerous and diverse effects.  
Regulations that affect fatality risks are frequently evaluated using benefit-cost analysis (BCA). In the 
United States, such evaluation has been required for federal regulations under a series of 
presidential executive orders beginning in 1981; regulatory impact analysis, including quantification 
of benefits, costs, and distributional effects, is required by nearly all OECD member states (OECD 
2018). We describe the way fatality risks are evaluated using BCA and contrast it with evaluation 
under several prominent social-welfare functions.  
As described in the following section, the approach to valuing mortality risk used in BCA centers on 
the ‘value per statistical life’ or VSL (called the ‘value of a prevented fatality’ or VPF in the United 
Kingdom). Under standard theory, the VSL is expected to vary across individuals who differ in wealth, 
baseline mortality risk, and other dimensions such as age. Differences in VSL between individuals 
imply that the benefits of reducing fatality risk depend on whose risk is reduced. Government actors 
and others are often uncomfortable with explicitly valuing risk reductions differently across 
individuals; there has been sharp public criticism when values have been differentiated based on 
income or age (e.g., Cameron 2010, Robinson 2007, Viscusi 2009). Perhaps as a result, it is common 
practice to use the same VSL for all affected individuals in a country (although it is also common to 
assume that VSL will increase over time in response to assumed future increases in income). The 
reluctance to allowing VSL to vary across individuals may also reflect the tension between efficiency 
and distributional concerns; conventional BCA measures allocative efficiency, setting concerns about 
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the distribution of effects aside on the assumption they will be addressed through supplementary 
distributional analysis.  
Although most distributional analysis of U.S. regulations is qualitative (Robinson et al. 2016), a 
growing literature explores the use of inequality measures to quantify distributional effects, 
especially in the context of environmental justice. This literature uses inequality indices to evaluate 
the distribution of risk from, or exposure to, environmental hazards and whether racial/ethnic or 
low-income groups are particularly burdened. It has been applied to multiple case studies (see Levy 
2021 and Sheriff and Maguire 2020 for citations). Key issues include adapting measures of the 
distribution of goods (e.g., income) to the distribution of bads (e.g., mortality risk), evaluating 
absolute or proportional differences, the importance of parameterizing inequality aversion, and 
whether inequality is evaluated across groups that are ordered (e.g., by income) or unordered (e.g., 
by race or ethnicity) (Levy 2021). Levy et al. (2006) reviewed multiple indices and recommended use 
of the Atkinson index, which measures relative differences; Sheriff and Maguire (2020) 
recommended the use of Fleurbaey’s equally distributed equivalent measure with the Kolm-Pollak 
inequality index. The Kolm-Pollak index is sensitive to absolute differences and hence yields the same 
result when measuring differences in mortality risk as differences in survival probability; in contrast, 
the Atkinson index is sensitive to proportional differences and yields different results.1  
In contrast to conventional BCA, SWFs can integrate concerns about equitable distribution with those 
about efficiency. We present and describe the results of using SWFs to characterize the value of 
reducing mortality risk through regulation. For consistency with the literature that applies BCA to 
environmental, health, and safety risks, we measure individual wellbeing using von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions; for simplicity, we assume that utility functions are homogenous (i.e., 
that individuals have the same utility function but may differ in wealth, baseline risk, or other 
characteristics). Adler and Decancq (chapter 3, this volume) describe alternative measures of 
individual wellbeing. 
We examine three benchmark SWFs: utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian, and ex post prioritarian. The 
utilitarian SWF is the dominant approach in the SWF literature; prioritarian SWFs add a concern for 
the distribution of wellbeing (Adler, chapter 2, this volume). In the context of fatality risk, the 
 




difference between ex ante and ex post perspectives is important, and so we examine both ex ante 
and ex post prioritarian SWFs.2 
This chapter is closely related to other chapters in this volume concerned with health risk, 
particularly chapter 6 on health care (Cookson, Norheim, and Skarda) and chapter 12 on COVID-19 
(Bloom, Ferranna, and Sevilla). 
In the following section, the standard one-period model for VSL is presented together with analysis 
of how VSL varies with individual characteristics, specifically wealth and baseline risk. Sections 7.3 
and 7.4 apply the benchmark SWFs, both utilitarian and prioritarian, to evaluate the social value of 
mortality-risk reduction and how it depends on individuals’ wealth and baseline risk. Section 7.3 
analyzes the one-period model introduced in Section 7.2 and Section 7.4 describes a multiperiod 
model, which permits consideration of the effects of individuals’ ages. Section 7.5 presents 
simulations calibrated to the U.S. population that illustrate how the value of mortality-risk reduction 
varies by age and income under BCA and the benchmark SWFs. Section 7.6 describes two extensions: 
alternative SWFs that can incorporate aversion to catastrophes that produce many deaths, and 
evaluating effects of health and nonfatal health risks using BCA and the benchmark SWFs. Section 7.7 
concludes.  
7.2. Valuing mortality risk changes in BCA: the value per statistical life 
Benefit-cost analysis is based on measuring changes in individuals’ wellbeing as monetary values. 
These values are positive for individuals who are better off with a policy and negative for those who 
are worse off. The sum of these values across the population is described as the net social benefit; if 
it is positive, then hypothetical compensation payments (from those who gain to those who are 
harmed) could be arranged such that everyone would be better off with the policy change and 
payment or receipt of compensation than without the policy change and compensation. 
There are two alternative definitions of the monetary value of the effect of a  change in mortality risk 
(or other policy effect). The compensating surplus is the change in wealth that compensates for the 
change in risk in the sense that the individual’s wellbeing is unaffected by the combination of the 
change in risk and wealth. Compensating surplus is the individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a risk 
reduction and willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for a risk increase. The equivalent surplus is 
 
2 Adler (chapter 2, this volume) uses the term SWF to mean a rule for ranking well-being vectors and the term 
uncertainty module to mean a method for incorporating uncertainty about the vector. We use the term SWF to 
mean the combination of an SWF and an uncertainty module and hence describe ex ante prioritarianism and ex 
post prioritarianism as different SWFs. 
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the change in wealth that is equivalent to the change in risk, in the sense that either change alone 
has the same effect on her wellbeing. Equivalent surplus is the individual’s WTA to forgo a risk 
decrease and WTP to prevent a risk increase. For small changes in risk, the two values are similar in 
theory, although stated-preference studies find that the equivalent surplus (WTA to forgo a risk 
reduction) is often substantially larger than the compensating surplus (WTP for a risk reduction), by a 
factor on the order of five (Tunçel and Hammitt 2014). 
The value per statistical life (VSL) is conceptualized as an individual-specific quantity equal to the 
individual’s marginal rate of substitution of wealth for a reduction of her mortality risk in a specified 
period. It is the ratio of her compensating surplus for a change in mortality risk to the magnitude of 
the change, for infinitesimally small changes in risk. The time period is generally short (e.g., a year). 
Risk is defined as the probability of dying in a specified period (as a hazard rate per unit time). The 
value of surviving a period may depend on its duration; the value of surviving the current decade 
generally exceeds the value of surviving the current hour.  
The conventional one-period model (Drèze 1962, Jones-Lee 1974, Weinstein et al. 1980) assumes the 
individual wishes to maximize her expected utility, which depends on her probability of surviving the 
current period and her utility conditional on surviving and on not surviving (each of which may 
depend on wealth). Specifically, expected utility 
 U = p u(c) + (1 – p) v(c)         (7.1) 
where p is the probability of surviving the period, u(c) and v(c) are utility conditional on surviving and 
not surviving the period, and c is wealth. The utility of wealth conditional on surviving the period 
depends on the lottery over future conditions the individual will face if she survives, including her 
future longevity, health, and income. The utility of wealth conditional on dying during the period is 
often called a bequest function; it represents the utility gained by knowing one’s wealth will be 
passed on to one’s children or other heirs in the event of one’s death. Any monetary effect of dying, 
such as medical bills or funeral expenses, can be incorporated in the definition of the bequest 
function. 
It is conventional and usually reasonable to assume that survival is preferred to death (u(c) > v(c)), 
the marginal utility of wealth is strictly larger given survival than as a bequest (u’(c) > v’(c)) and the 
marginal utility of a bequest is greater than or equal to zero (v’(c) ≥ 0). In words, it is never harmful to 
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die with more wealth but it is better to spend it while living. It is also assumed the individual is risk 
averse (or risk neutral) with respect to wealth, i.e., u”(c) ≤ 0 and v”(c) ≤ 0.3 
The VSL or marginal rate of substitution of wealth for survival probability is the change in wealth 
accompanying an infinitesimal change in survival probability that leaves the individual no better and 
no worse off than before (i.e., holding expected utility U constant). VSL can be obtained by 
differentiating equation (7.1) to obtain 









.       (7.2) 
Equation (7.2) shows that VSL is the ratio of the gain in utility from surviving the period rather than 
dying (u(c)) to the expected opportunity cost of wealth (EU’(c)), which is the rate at which utility 
could be obtained by spending on other goods and services rather than on reducing mortality risk. 
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, VSL is (the absolute value of) the slope of the individual’s indifference 
curve between wealth and survival probability at her current wealth and mortality risk, and the 
monetary value of a small risk change is approximately equal to the product of VSL and the 
magnitude of the risk change. Under the assumptions described above, indifference curves are 
downward sloping and convex, as illustrated. Because increases in wealth and survival probability are 
both desirable, indifference curves are downward sloping (the individual is willing to give up some of 
one attribute to obtain more of the other). The indifference curves are convex because holding 
survival probability fixed, an increase in wealth increases VSL4 and holding wealth fixed, an increase 
in survival probability decreases VSL.5  
A slope is quantified as rise over run; by convention, VSL is measured for a run (change in survival 
probability) from 0 to 1. As is clear from Figure 7.1, the amount an individual would accept as 
compensation for a decrease in survival probability from 1 to 0 is much larger than her VSL (at 
survival probability one) and may be infinite (if the indifference curve does not intersect the vertical 
axis); the amount she would pay to increase survival probability from 0 to 1 is much less than her VSL 
 
3 A single prime denotes first derivative and a double prime denotes second derivative. 
4 An increase in wealth increases the numerator of equation (7.2) (because the marginal utility of wealth is 
larger conditional on survival than on death) and (weakly) decreases the denominator (because the utility 
conditional on survival and the bequest exhibit weakly decreasing marginal utility). 
5 An increase in survival probability has no effect on the numerator of equation (7.2) but increases the 
denominator as it puts more weight on the (larger) marginal utility of wealth conditional on survival and less 
weight on the (smaller) marginal utility of a bequest. Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) call this the ‘dead-anyway 
effect’ because if survival probability is low, spending is likely to come out of the bequest and the opportunity 
cost of spending is small. 
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(at survival probability near zero). Indeed, conventional estimates of VSL greatly exceed individual 
wealth, and so an individual would be unable to pay as much as her VSL to avoid certain death. 
Government agents and the public can be uncomfortable applying different values of risk reduction 
to different people. This concern is exacerbated by the term value per statistical life, which is easily 
misunderstood as measuring the total value of an individual’s life (Cameron 2010, Simon et al. 2019). 
Benefit-cost analysis of policies that affect a domestic population almost invariably value risk 
reductions to different individuals using a common VSL, independent of income, age, health, and 
other factors. For policies that reduce current mortality risk by the same amount for each person, or 
for which individual risk reductions are uncorrelated with factors such as age and income that affect 
VSL, the use of a common value is unproblematic.6 When comparing policies that disproportionately 
affect different subpopulations (e.g., young v. old, rich v. poor), use of a common VSL may be 
inconsistent with the principles on which BCA is based and can produce biased results. Use of a 
common VSL may produce results that better accord with preferences for equity that might be 
obtained using a weighted BCA. Baker et al. (2008) examined the question of when a common VSL 
might exist and suggest using weighted BCA. 
Social-welfare functions provide a means for explicitly incorporating concerns for both efficiency and 
equity in a policy evaluation. In Section 7.3, we describe the application of SWFs to valuing fatality 
risk in the context of the standard one-period model described above. In Section 7.4, we extend the 
analysis to life-cycle models that allow comparison of the value of reducing risk to individuals of 
different ages. We present simulation results illustrating the magnitudes of the effects in Section 7.5. 
7.3. SWFs applied to a single-period model 
Using the single-period model described above (equation (7.1)), Adler et al. (2014) evaluated how 
changes to individuals’ survival probabilities affect social welfare as measured by alternative social-
welfare functions. They defined the ‘social value of risk reduction’ (SVRR) as the rate of increase in 
social welfare resulting from a small increase to an individual’s survival probability, i.e., as the partial 
derivative of social welfare with respect to an individual’s survival probability. SVRR for an SWF is the 
analog of VSL for BCA, as VSL measures the rate of increase of net social benefits associated with a 
small increase to an individual’s survival probability. Exploiting this analogy, we describe VSL as the 
SVRR under BCA. Adler et al. (2014) examined how SVRR depends on wealth and baseline risk under 
 
6 Under BCA, the social value of reducing mortality risk by a small amount for many people equals the sum of 
the affected individuals’ monetary values, which are approximately equal to the product of each individual’s 
risk reduction and VSL. If the individual risk reductions are equal to each other or are uncorrelated with 
individuals’ VSLs, this sum is equal to the sum of the average risk reduction multiplied by the average VSL.  
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different SWFs; as noted above, VSL is increasing in these attributes.  In this section, we describe the 
results for three benchmark SWFs: the utilitarian, ex ante prioritarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs.  
To account for possible dependence of the realization of the mortality risk among individuals 
(examined in Section 7.6.1), the formalization is slightly more complex than introduced in Section 
7.2. Specifically, assume there are N individuals indexed by i. Let s denote the state of nature and s 
denote the probability of state s. An individual’s outcome in each state includes her wealth ci (which 
is assumed to be constant across states) and realization of the mortality risk, i.e., whether she 
survives or dies during the period. An individual’s expected utility 
( ) ( ) ( )1s si s i i i i
s
U l u c l v c  = + −
   where 
s
il  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if she survives in 
state s and 0 otherwise. The utility functions conditional on survival and death, u and v, are assumed 
to be interpersonally comparable, to satisfy the standard conditions described in Section 7.2, and to 
be identical across individuals (to allow us to focus on the effects of other interpersonal differences). 
An individual’s probability of surviving the period equals the sum of the probabilities of the states in 
which she survives, si s i
s
p l= .  
An SWF ranks vectors that describe the wellbeing of all individuals. In the context of mortality risk, 
individuals’ wellbeing is uncertain (they may live or die) and so the SWF requires a procedure for 
ranking risks over wellbeing vectors, an uncertainty module (Adler, chapter 2, this volume). Two 
natural uncertainty modules for a given SWF are (a) to calculate the expected value of the SWF and 
(b) to apply the SWF to the vector of expected utilities associated with a policy. In the case of 
utilitarianism, these are mathematically equivalent. In the case of prioritarianism, they are not. 
The utilitarian SWF is the sum of individual utilities. Let SU denote social welfare under the utilitarian 
SWF. Because it is the sum of individual utilities, its ex ante and ex post forms are equal: 
𝑆𝑈 =∑𝜋𝑠 [∑𝑙𝑖












= ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑢(𝑐𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑣(𝑐𝑖)𝑖 .       (7.3) 
Note that the first expression (the ex post form) equals the expected value (across states) of the sum 
of individuals’ realized (ex post) utilities. The second expression (the ex ante form) equals the sum 
across individuals of their expected utilities, before the mortality risks are resolved. The last 
expression is a simplification of the second expression, using the fact that an individual’s survival 
probability is the sum of the probabilities of the states in which she survives. 
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In contrast to the utilitarian SWF, the ex post and ex ante prioritarian SWFs differ from each other. 
Let g(ˑ) be the prioritarian transformation function, which is assumed to be continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. 
The ex post prioritarian SWF is  
 𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑃 = ∑ 𝜋𝑠[∑ 𝑔[𝑙𝑖
𝑠𝑢(𝑐𝑖) + (1 − 𝑙𝑖
𝑠)𝑣(𝑐𝑖)]𝑖 ]𝑠 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑔[𝑢(𝑐𝑖)]𝑖 + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑔[𝑣(𝑐𝑖)], (7.4) 
which is the expected value (across states) of the sum of individuals’ realized utilities as transformed 
by the function g.  
The ex ante prioritarian SWF is 
𝑆𝐸𝐴𝑃 = ∑ 𝑔[𝑝𝑖𝑢(𝑐𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑣(𝑐𝑖)]𝑖 ,       (7.5) 
which is the sum of the individuals’ expected utilities as transformed by the function g. 
All three of the benchmark SWFs are separable across individuals. Social welfare is the population 
sum of some individual-specific quantity: expected utility in the case of the utilitarian SWF, expected 
transformed utility in the case of the ex post prioritarian SWF, and transformed expected utility in 
the case of the ex ante prioritarian SWF. This implies the effect on social welfare of a change to an 
individual’s risk is independent of the risk and other characteristics of everyone else. 
As noted above, the social value of risk reduction (SVRR) for an individual is defined as the rate of 




each SWF. VSL is the analogous rate of change of net social benefits under BCA. 
For the utilitarian SWF (equation (7.3)), the SVRR for individual i is u(ci) – v(ci). Note this is the 
numerator of the VSL (equation (7.2)), which equals the difference in utility between survival and 
death. 
For the ex post prioritarian SWF (equation (7.4)), the SVRR is g[u(ci)] – g[v(ci)]. This is similar to the 
SVRR for the utilitarian SWF except the realized utilities are transformed by the function g. 
For the ex ante prioritarian SWF (equation (7.5)), the SVRR is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1i i i i i ig p u c p v c u c v c    + − −    . In words, it equals the SVRR for the utilitarian SWF 
(the second term, in brackets) multiplied by a factor that depends on the individual’s expected utility; 
this priority factor is larger for individuals with smaller expected utility (because g is concave). 
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Recall that VSL is increasing in the individual’s wealth and mortality risk. Consider the effects of 
mortality risk and wealth on the SVRR under the three benchmark SWFs, summarized in Table 7.1 
(the effects of health, shown in the last column, are discussed in Section 7.6.2). Unlike VSL, the SVRR 
under the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs are independent of mortality risk, because these 
SWFs are expected values (of individual wellbeing or transformed wellbeing, respectively) and hence 
are linear functions of an individual’s survival probability. In contrast, the SVRR under the ex ante 
prioritarian SWF is increasing in mortality risk (because that decreases the individual’s expected 
utility and hence increases her social priority). The sensitivity to baseline risk of VSL and SVRR under 
the ex ante prioritarian SWF implies that BCA and the ex ante prioritarian SWF exhibit a preference 
for risk equity, defined as a more equal distribution of risk holding the expected number of fatalities 
constant. In contrast, the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs are neutral with respect to risk 
equity.7  
Turning to wealth, SVRR under the utilitarian SWF is increasing in wealth, as is VSL. However, the 
utilitarian SVRR is less sensitive to wealth than is VSL. Recall that SVRR under the utilitarian SWF 
equals the numerator of VSL (equation (7.2)), which increases with wealth under the assumption that 
the marginal utility of wealth conditional on survival is greater than as a bequest. The denominator of 
VSL decreases with wealth, increasing the sensitivity of VSL to wealth compared with the sensitivity 
of the SVRR under the utilitarian SWF.8 The effect of wealth on the SVRR under the two prioritarian 
SWFs depends on the curvature of the transformation function g. Although greater wealth increases 
an individual’s utility, it decreases her social priority and the combined effect of wealth on SVRR can 
be positive, negative, or zero. If g is close to linear, the prioritarian SWFs are close to the utilitarian 
SWF and the effect of wealth on SVRR is positive; if g is sufficiently concave, the effect is negative.  
To summarize, the effects of mortality risk and wealth on the social value of risk reduction differ 
between BCA and the three benchmark SWFs. Baseline risk increases the SVRR under BCA and the ex 
ante prioritarian SWF but it has no effect on the SVRR under the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian 
SWFs. In contrast, wealth increases the SVRR under BCA and the utilitarian SWF, but its effect under 
the two prioritarian SWFs can be positive, negative, or zero. The only SWF under which the SVRR can 
be equal across individuals differing in wealth and baseline risk is the ex post prioritarian SWF, and 
then only if the curvature of the transformation function exactly offsets the positive effect of wealth 
on individual utility. 
 
7 Risk equity is discussed in Section 7.6.1. 
8 If the utility of wealth conditional on survival and on death is risk neutral (u” = v” = 0), then the denominator 
is unaffected by wealth and SVRR under the utilitarian SWF and VSL are equally sensitive to wealth. 
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7.4. SWFs applied to a lifetime model 
The effect of an individual’s age on the social value of reducing her current-period mortality risk is of 
significant policy interest. Over most of the lifespan, mortality risk increases with age at an 
accelerating rate. Many important sources of mortality risk increase sharply with age, including 
cardiovascular disease and many cancers. One of the largest environmental-health risks, exposure to 
fine-particulate air pollution, is believed to increase mortality risk more for older than younger 
individuals; the effect of exposure on mortality risk is consistent with the assumption that exposure 
increases baseline risk by a constant factor, a so-called constant proportional hazard. In contrast, 
motor-vehicle safety programs often produce larger risk reductions for young adults, who face larger 
fatality risk from this hazard than do older individuals.  
Because life expectancy conditional on surviving the current period tends to be negatively associated 
with age,9 it seems intuitive that the social value of risk reduction is larger for younger than for older 
individuals. Consistent with this perspective, cost-effectiveness analysis of health interventions often 
measures effectiveness by the expected increase in quality-adjusted life years. Under this metric, 
decreasing mortality risk to a younger individual (with greater life expectancy) generally produces 
greater benefits. Some commentators go further, endorsing a ‘fair innings’ argument that “everyone 
be given an equal chance to have a fair innings, to reach the appropriate threshold but, having 
reached it, they have received their entitlement. The rest of their life is the sort of bonus which may 
be canceled when this is necessary to help others reach the threshold” (Harris 1985). The fair innings 
perspective recommends giving greater priority to the young than would be justified by their larger 
expected increase in quality-adjusted life years (Williams 1997). 
As described below, neither VSL nor the SVRR under any of the benchmark SWFs we consider 
necessarily decrease with age; in each case, there are conditions under which the social value of risk 
reduction is larger for an older than an otherwise identical younger individual. However, both the ex 
ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs give more priority to a younger individual than does the utilitarian 
SWF, a property that Adler et al. (2021) denote ‘priority to the young’. 
The effects of age and life expectancy are implicit in the single-period model introduced in Section 
7.2. Utility conditional on survival u(c) implicitly depends on the individual’s uncertain prospects if 
she survives the period, including her future longevity, health, income, and other factors. Hence u(c) 
can be interpreted as her expected utility conditional on surviving the period. Normally, greater life 
expectancy will increase the utility of surviving the current period, the utility gain from survival (the 
 
9 Life expectancy is decreasing in age if the hazard rate (the current mortality risk) does not decrease with age. 
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numerator of equation (7.2), holding the bequest v(c) constant), and hence the SVRR under the 
utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs. However, it need not increase SVRR under the ex ante 
prioritarian SWF or VSL. Under the ex ante prioritarian SWF, the increase in the utility of survival can 
be more than offset by the decrease in the social priority of the individual. For VSL, the increase in 
the numerator can be offset by an increase in the expected opportunity cost of spending (the 
denominator of equation (7.2)). For example, if the individual will have no future income and must 
support herself from current wealth, the opportunity cost of spending conditional on survival u’(c) 
will be larger when life expectancy is greater. Depending on the relative magnitudes of its effects on 
u(c) and on u’(c), the effect of life expectancy on VSL may be positive, zero, or negative. 
Further progress in evaluating how the SVRR depends on age requires a more-explicit model of how 
wellbeing depends on age and life expectancy. The conventional multi-period model assumes 
wellbeing depends on the present value of future utility, where utility in each period depends on 
consumption (and implicitly on health and other factors). Although the utility of a bequest might 
depend on the age at death (or on the age of one’s children, which is correlated with age at death), 
applications of this model set the utility of a bequest to zero (primarily for simplicity).  
Under the conventional multi-period model, the individual seeks to maximize her expected lifetime 
wellbeing, subject to a budget constraint. The age-dependence of VSL depends on the conditions 
under which an individual can reallocate income10 to consumption in different periods, e.g., whether 
she can borrow against future income or save past income to adjust her consumption over time. It 
also depends on how the rate at which she discounts future utility compares with the interest rate, 
which affects returns to saving and costs of borrowing. When income increases with age (as it usually 
does over younger ages), if the individual cannot borrow against future income her VSL first rises 
then falls with age, exhibiting an inverted-U pattern (Shepard and Zeckhauser 1984). When the 
individual can both save past income and borrow against future income and the interest rate and 
utility-discount rate are equal, optimal consumption is constant over time and VSL decreases with 
age (Shepard and Zeckhauser 1984). In contrast, when the utility discount rate is smaller than the 
interest rate, it is optimal to defer consumption, at least at younger ages, and the opportunity cost of 
spending decreases with age. In this case, VSL again follows an inverted-U pattern (Ng 1992).  
Adler et al. (2021) analyzed the social value of risk reduction for individuals of different ages using 
the standard multi-period model under the same benchmark SWFs described in Section 7.3: 
 
10 It is conventional in these models to assume that income in each period is exogenous. A richer model could 
allow the individual to alter her income trajectory by investing in education or choosing how many hours to 
work each period. 
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utilitarian, ex ante and ex post prioritarian. In the base case, individuals face identical time paths of 
mortality risk and income, but their current ages differ because of differences in birth date. The SWFs 
are functions of individuals’ lifetime utility. In the model, an individual experiences the utility of 
consuming in a period only if she survives that period; if not, her lifetime utility includes only the 
periods before the current period. This assumption is not limiting (periods can be arbitrarily short) 
but it influences the interpretation of some of the results.  
The SVRR depends on whether the individual can save or borrow and, if she can, on whether the 
policy that reduces mortality risk is anticipated (which affects her planned consumption path) or 
comes as a surprise. In the base case, an individual’s consumption is assumed to be equal to her 
(exogenously determined) income in each year that she survives; she can neither save nor borrow. In 
an extension (Adler et al. 2019), the individual is assumed to be able to save or borrow at actuarially 
fair rates, so she can allocate her expected lifetime wealth to consumption across all periods, but the 
policy comes as a surprise and so does not affect her consumption plan. 
7.4.1. Effects of age and priority to the young 
As noted above, the effect of age on VSL depends on whether the individual can finance current 
consumption by borrowing against future income and on how she discounts future utility compared 
with the interest rate. Under some conditions, VSL decreases with age; under others, it increases 
over younger ages then decreases over older ages. Similarly, SVRR under the benchmark SWFs can 
but does not necessarily decrease with age. However, compared with the utilitarian SWF, both the ex 
ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs give more priority to reducing risk to younger than to older 
individuals. 
Consider a simple two-period example. At birth each individual has probability p1 of surviving her first 
period (“youth”) and, conditional on surviving the first period, probability p2 of surviving her second 
period (“adulthood”). Her utility of surviving the first period is u1 and utility of surviving the second 
period is u2 (utility for a period she does not survive is zero). A young person, in her first period, has 
expected lifetime utility p1 u1 + p1 p2 u2. An old person, in her second period, has already survived her 
first period and has expected lifetime utility u1 + p2 u2. A reduction in current-period risk increases p1 
for the young person and increases p2 for the old person.  
Under the utilitarian SWF, the SVRR for the young person is u1 + p2 u2 and the SVRR for the old 
person is u2. The difference, SVRR(young) – SVRR(old) = u1 + (p2 – 1) u2, can be interpreted as the sum 
of two effects, a ‘duration effect’ u1, which reflects the longer future life the young person may live 
(two periods rather than one) and a ‘risk effect’ (p2 – 1) u2, which reflects the fact that the young 
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person has a smaller chance of living during her second period, because she might not survive her 
first period, while the old person already has. The duration effect is positive and the risk effect is 
negative, hence the SVRR may be larger or smaller for the young than for the old person. Typically 
the difference in SVRR will be positive but it can be negative if u1 is small compared with u2 and p2 is 
small compared with one.  
Similarly, under the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs, the SVRR for the young person is not 
necessarily larger than for the old person. However, the ratio of the SVRR for the young person to the 
SVRR for the old person is always larger under either of the prioritarian SWFs than it is under the 
utilitarian SWF. In this sense, the two prioritarian SWFs exhibit a property that Adler et al. (2021) call 
‘ratio priority to the young’. 
















+ 𝑝2). The last term (in parentheses) is the ratio for 
the utilitarian SWF. It is multiplied by a term that depends on the slope of the transformation 
function g evaluated at the expected lifetime wellbeing of the young person (in the numerator) and 
at the expected lifetime wellbeing of the old person (in the denominator). Because the expected 
lifetime wellbeing of the young person is less than that of the old person, the numerator is larger 
than the denominator and so the ratio SVRR(young)/SVRR(old) is larger than under the utilitarian 






+ 𝑝2. This ratio is larger than the ratio for the 





These results can be extended to a model with more than two periods. For example, let each period 
be one year. Consider two individuals whose age-specific mortality risks and consumption levels are 
identical; the only difference between them is their year of birth. Let A0 and A1 denote the ages of 
the younger and older individuals, respectively. Consider the utilitarian SWF. Reducing current-period 
mortality risk increases each individual’s chances of being alive in all future years and hence gain 
utility from consumption in those years. The duration effect is that, although both individuals 
increase their chances of living at ages greater than A1, the younger individual also stands to gain the 
utility of living at ages between A0 and A1; the older individual has already lived these years. The risk 
effect is that the chance of experiencing the utility of living at each age greater than A1 is smaller for 
the younger individual, who may die before reaching age A1. If the utility of living each year is 
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constant or decreasing with age (e.g., because income is constant, consumption is perfectly 
smoothed, or utility decreases as health declines with age) and the probability of surviving a period 
does not increase with age, then the duration effect exceeds the risk effect and the SVRR is larger for 
the younger individual. But if the utility of living per year or the probability of surviving a year can 
increase with age, then the risk effect can outweigh the duration effect and the utilitarian SWF can 
give priority to reducing risk to the older individual. 
Under the ex ante prioritarian SWF, the difference in social welfare associated with reducing current 
risk to the younger rather than the older individual includes the same duration and risk terms as the 
utilitarian SWF. In addition, there is a third term which has the same sign as g’(V0) – g’(V1), where V0 
and V1 are the expected lifetime utilities of the younger and older individuals, respectively (Adler et 
al. 2021). The older individual’s expected lifetime utility is larger than that of the younger individual’s 
(V0 < V1) because the older individual has already survived the risk of dying between ages A0 and A1. 
Hence the difference g’(V0) – g’(V1) is positive. This term is denoted the ‘priority to the young’ term 
and it ensures that the ex ante prioritarian SWF gives greater priority to the young than does the 
utilitarian SWF. Indeed, Adler et al. (2021) prove a stronger result: that the ratio of the SVRR for the 
younger individual to the SVRR for the older individual is strictly larger under the ex ante prioritarian 
SWF than under the utilitarian SWF.  
The ex post prioritarian SWF also assigns greater priority to reducing current risk to the younger than 
to the older individual. Although the formula differs from that for the ex ante prioritarian SWF, the 
same three effects are present: duration, risk, and priority to the young. The stronger result also 
holds, i.e., that the ratio of the SVRR for the younger individual to the SVRR for the older individual is 
strictly larger under the ex post prioritarian SWF than under the utilitarian SWF. 
While both ex ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs give priority to the young compared with the 
utilitarian SWF, it is not true that one of these always gives more priority to the young than the 
other. To demonstrate, return to the two-period example and let u1 = u2 = 1, p2 ≈ 1, and g(u) = √𝑢. 
The ratio SVRR(young)/SVRR(old) equals approximately 2 √𝑝1⁄  under the ex ante prioritarian SWF 
and approximately √2 (√2 − 1)⁄  under the ex post prioritarian SWF. Both ratios are of course larger 
than the corresponding ratio under the utilitarian SWF, which equals approximately 2. The ratio for 
the ex ante prioritarian SWF depends on the value of p1 but the ratio for the ex post prioritarian SWF 
does not. For values of p1 larger than (2 − √2)
2
≈ 0.34 the ratio for the ex ante prioritarian SWF is 
smaller than the ratio for the ex post prioritarian SWF; for values of p1 smaller than this threshold the 
situation is reversed. 
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7.4.2. Effects of income and baseline risk 
When analyzing the effects on the SVRR of differences in income or in risk, one must distinguish 
between differences that last for only a single period, for multiple periods, or throughout the 
lifetime. Moreover, the effects of a change for a single period can depend on whether that period is 
in the past, the present, or the future. 
The effects of single-period and all-period differences in income and survival probability on the SVRR 
are summarized in Table 7.2, for the case in which the individual can neither borrow nor save, so 
consumption equals income in each period. Note that the SVRR under BCA and the utilitarian SWF 
are unaffected by differences in past-period income but SVRR under the prioritarian SWFs is affected. 
Prioritarian SWFs are history-dependent; they give priority to individuals with lower lifetime utility 
(expected utility in the case of the ex ante and possible realized utility in the case of the ex post 
prioritarian SWF). Greater income in a previous period increases lifetime utility and hence decreases 
the priority associated with improving an individual’s wellbeing under both prioritarian SWFs. 
Because it has no effect on the gain from surviving the current period, greater income in a previous 
period decreases the SVRR. 
Greater income in the current or a future period increases SVRR under BCA, the utilitarian, and the 
ex post prioritarian SWF. In all three cases, greater income increases wellbeing conditional on 
survival.11 In contrast, the effect is ambiguous under the ex ante prioritarian SWF; higher income 
increases the utility gain from survival but decreases the priority given to the individual. If the 
transformation function g is not too concave, the ex ante prioritarian is similar to the utilitarian SWF 
and higher current or future income increases the SVRR; if the transformation function is sufficiently 
concave, the decrease in priority more than offsets the increase in wellbeing. Combining the effects 
of changes in past, present, or future income implies that the effect of an increase in income in all 
periods increases the SVRR under BCA and the utilitarian SWF but has an ambiguous effect under the 
two prioritarian SWFs. For the ex ante case, higher expected lifetime utility reduces social priority, 
and this effect can be large enough to offset the gain in expected lifetime utility if the transformation 
function is sufficiently concave. For the ex post case, the ambiguity arises because an increase in 
current or future income increases SVRR but an increase in past income decreases SVRR; the net 
effect depends on the relative magnitudes of these effects. 
 
11 Recall an individual gains utility from the current period only if she survives it. 
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The effects of a change in survival probability in a past period have no effect on the SVRR under BCA 
or any of the benchmark SWFs. This is because the risk of dying in these periods has already been 
resolved, so the values of the probabilities are irrelevant to lifetime wellbeing.  
An increase in current survival probability has no effect on SVRR under the utilitarian and ex post 
prioritarian SWFs because it has no effect on lifetime wellbeing conditional on surviving the current 
period. In contrast, it decreases the SVRR under BCA and the ex ante prioritarian SWF. For BCA, an 
increase in current survival probability has no effect on the utility gain from survival (the numerator 
of equation (7.2)) but increases the expected opportunity cost of reduced consumption (the 
denominator of equation (7.2), the dead-anyway effect). Under the ex ante prioritarian SWF, the 
change in survival probability has no effect on the expected gain in utility from surviving the current 
period but increases expected lifetime utility and hence decreases social priority. 
The effect of an increase in a future-period survival probability is to increase SVRR under BCA12, the 
utilitarian and the ex post prioritarian SWF; in all three cases, the change increases expected lifetime 
wellbeing conditional on surviving the current period for BCA and the utilitarian SWF, and expected 
transformed lifetime wellbeing for the ex post prioritarian SWF. In contrast, the effect is ambiguous 
under the ex ante prioritarian SWF because the increase in expected lifetime wellbeing can be more 
than offset by the associated decrease in priority if the transformation function g is sufficiently 
concave. 
Because the effect of an increase in current or future survival probabilities is to increase SVRR under 
the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs, so is the effect of a permanent increase in survival 
probabilities. In contrast, because the effects of an increase in current or future survival probabilities 
differ from each other under BCA and can differ under the ex ante prioritarian SWF, the effects of a 
permanent change are ambiguous and depend on which effect is larger. 
In an extension to this model, Adler et al. (2019) analyze the case in which the individual can save 
and borrow against future income, which allows her to reallocate consumption over time. Specifically 
they assume the individual can sign a contract at birth pledging her income in each year she survives 
to an insurer that will pay her a defined annuity (that she will spend on consumption) each year she 
survives. The expected present value of her planned consumption path is equal to the expected 
present value of her (exogenous) income path; these depend on her time path of mortality risk and 
 
12 As noted above, in the single-period model an increase in life expectancy conditional on survival can 
decrease VSL if it increases the opportunity cost of spending. In the model of Adler et al. (2021), the individual 
receives income each period she survives and sets consumption equal to income, so an increase in life 
expectancy has no effect on the opportunity cost of spending. 
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the interest rate. The individual’s optimal consumption path increases, decreases, or does not 
change with age if she discounts future utility at a rate that is smaller than, larger than, or equal to 
the interest rate, respectively.  
The effect of being able to reallocate consumption over time on the SVRR depends on whether the 
policy that decreases mortality risk is anticipated (perhaps with some probability) or not. An 
anticipated change in mortality risk could affect the terms on which the individual can exchange her 
income stream for an annuity stream. Adler et al. (2019) analyze the case in which the policy that 
reduces risk is unanticipated; it comes as a surprise and does not affect the terms on which the 
individual can purchase her annuity or her planned consumption path. Hence the findings that the ex 
ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs exhibit priority to the young (compared with the utilitarian SWF), 
remain true in this extension to the model. The effect of a change in income on the SVRR does not 
depend on whether the income change occurs for a period in the past, present, or future; in each 
case, a higher income in one period increases the expected present value of lifetime income. This 
implies the effect of a change in income in any period is qualitatively the same as a permanent 
increase in income under the base-case model; it increases SVRR under BCA and the utilitarian SWF 
and has an ambiguous effect on SVRR under the two prioritarian SWFs (see Table 7.2). In contrast, 
the effect on the SVRR of a change in risk for a single period or for all periods differs from the base-
case; it is ambiguous under all of the evaluation frameworks. The intuition is that two individuals of 
the same age having identical lifetime income paths but different survival-probability paths will have 
different paths of planned consumption. 
This section reveals a diversity of qualitative effects of differences in income and baseline risk on 
SVRR across the different SWFs but gives little indication of their magnitudes. In the following section 
we report simulation exercises to help evaluate how large the effects of different evaluation 
methods may be on the SVRR of reducing mortality risk to individuals of different age and income. 
7.5. Simulations 
Adler et al. (2021) calculated the SVRR under BCA and each of the benchmark SWFs for a simulated 
population calibrated to the U.S. population. At each age, the distribution of income is based on U.S. 
Census data and the survival probability is based on the CDC lifetable, adjusted upward for higher 
and downward for lower incomes.13 It is assumed there is no income mobility and an individual’s 
income path over time corresponds to the median income of a fixed quintile of the income 
 
13 Annual mortality risk in each income quintile (lowest to highest) equals population risk multiplied by the 
following factors, derived from Chetty et al. (2016): 1.5, 1.2, 1, 0.9, 0.7. 
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distribution at each age (i.e., the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, or 90th percentile).14 The simulation is 
conducted for ages 20 through 100. Consumption is assumed to be equal to income in each year. 
Results for ages 20-24 and 75 and older are in part artifacts of setting income at these ages equal to 
their values at ages 25 and 74, respectively, due to limitations in how the income data are reported. 
The within-period individual utility function is ln(c) – ln($1,000), where c is annual income or 
consumption in dollars and the threshold level of $1,000 is based on the World Bank’s estimate of 
subsistence income; the utility discount rate is zero. For the prioritarian SWFs, the transformation 
function g(ˑ) is the Atkinson (isoelastic) function 𝑔(𝑢) =
𝑢1−𝛾
1−𝛾
 with two values of the inequality-
aversion parameter,  = 1, 2.15 
Figure 7.2 presents the SVRR by age and income quintile for BCA and the benchmark SWFs. For BCA, 
the SVRR is VSL. For this simulation, it tends to decrease with age while also exhibiting an inverted-U 
pattern, which is more pronounced for the higher-income quintiles. Because consumption is set 
equal to income, the inverted-U reflects the pattern of income with age rather than any saving or 
borrowing. The variation with income (and associated mortality risk) is large; as shown by Figure 7.3, 
at age 40 the VSL for an individual in the highest-income quintile is about 30 times as large as for an 
individual in the lowest-income quintile.  
The SVRR is monotonically decreasing as a function of age for all the SWFs. Under the utilitarian SWF, 
the SVRR is increasing in income but the effect is much smaller than for VSL; the ratio of the SVRR for 
the highest- to the lowest-income quintile is between 2.5 and 3 for ages between about 20 and 80 
(see Figure 7.3). The increase with income reflects two factors: expected future utility is larger 
because it is increasing in consumption, and life expectancy conditional on surviving the period is 
larger because it is increasing in income. For the prioritarian SWFs with inequality-aversion 
coefficient  = 1 (both ex ante and ex post), the effect of income is very small, though the SVRR is 
increasing with income. In contrast, with the larger coefficient of inequality aversion  = 2, the 
ordering by income is reversed with SVRR larger for lower- than for higher-income individuals. 
Individuals in lower-income quintiles receive greater priority because their consumption is lower and 
their expected lifetime is shorter. 
 
14 Income data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, data on individual money income 
in 2016 (https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pinc/pinc-01.html). This 
table reports income distribution by 5-year age increments from ages 25 to 74 but pools ages 15 to 24 years 
and 75 years and older. Survival data are from the United States Life Tables for 2014 
(https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life_tables.htm). 
15 When  = 1, g(u) = ln(u). 
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The effects of income and the associated difference in mortality risk on the SVRR are illustrated more 
clearly in Figure 7.3, which shows the ratio of SVRR for the highest-income quintile to SVRR for the 
lowest-income quintile as a function of age. The left panel includes the ratios for VSL and for income 
in addition to those for the SVRR under the benchmark SWFs; the right panel excludes VSL and 
income so that the differences among the SWFs are more clearly seen.  
For VSL, the ratio of SVRR for the highest to SVRR for the lowest-income quintile is greater than 20 at 
most ages. Its variation over time mirrors and exaggerates that of the ratio of income between the 
highest- and lowest-income quintiles, which increases from a value of about 8 to a peak of about 13 
near age 65 then decreases. For the SWFs, the proportional effect of income rises very slightly with 
age (except for the sharp drop at ages greater than about 90 years); it is largest for the utilitarian 
SWF (a factor of about 3). The results under the prioritarian SWFs are more sensitive to the 
coefficient of inequality aversion than to the difference between the ex ante and ex post forms. With 
inequality aversion equal to 1, the ratio of SVRR for the highest to the lowest income quintile rises 
with age from about 1 to 1.5. With inequality aversion equal to 2, the SVRR is smaller for the highest 
than for the lowest-income quintile; the ratio rises from about 0.5 to 0.7 (which implies the effect of 
income decreases with age, contrary to the patterns for the other SWFs). Recall that income is 
assumed to be constant for ages younger than 25 and older than 74, so patterns at these younger 
and older ages are influenced by this perhaps unrealistic assumption. 
The effects of age for median-income individuals are illustrated by Figure 7.4. Compared with the 
SVRR at age 60, the ex post prioritarian SWF produces the largest SVRR at young ages; the highest 
curve is with the inequality-aversion coefficient  equal to 2 and the second highest is with the 
coefficient equal to 1. The ex ante prioritarian SWF with inequality-aversion coefficients of 1 and 2 
and the utilitarian SWF produce very similar patterns of SVRR as a function of age that are nearly 
indistinguishable on this plot. As noted earlier, the evaluation under BCA is the outlier, with the SVRR 
increasing with age for younger ages then decreasing at older ages.  
Adler (2019, chapter 5) presents a similar simulation in which he evaluates policies that reduce 
current mortality risk but at a cost that decreases individuals’ current consumption. The population is 
divided into quintiles by income, with survival curves similar to those in the simulation described 
above. Wellbeing is measured using the same logarithmic utility function. In contrast, income is 
assumed to be constant over an individual’s lifetime. Using this framework, Adler evaluates policies 
that reduce current mortality risk (for one year) by 1 per 100,000 on average. The risk reduction may 
be distributed uniformly across individuals aged 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 years (present in equal 
numbers) or targeted to either the youngest quintile (20 year olds) or the poorest quintile. A 
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targeted policy reduces mortality risk by 5 per 100,000 for individuals in the targeted quintile and 
zero for all others. The one-year cost is distributed either uniformly or in proportion to income. Adler 
calculates the maximum cost of each policy (average reduction in individual consumption) such that 
the policy is preferred to the status quo, using BCA, the utilitarian, and ex post prioritarian SWFs 
(using the Atkinson transformation function with inequality-aversion coefficient  = 2). A policy 
increases social welfare if its average cost is less than the breakeven cost, i.e., more desirable policies 
have larger breakeven costs. 
Results are summarized in Table 7.3. Under BCA, the breakeven cost is unaffected by its allocation. It 
is smaller when the risk reduction is targeted to the poorest quintile (whose VSL is smaller). The 
breakeven cost is larger when the risk reduction is targeted to the youngest quintile, who have a 
larger VSL than do older cohorts. (In the simulation, VSL decreases with age because consumption is 
assumed to be constant over time.)  
Under the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs, the breakeven cost is always larger when costs 
are allocated in proportion to income rather than uniformly, because the utility loss of a reduction in 
consumption is smaller at higher incomes. The proportional difference is larger for the ex post 
prioritarian than for the utilitarian SWF, because the former exhibits aversion to inequality in 
wellbeing. Under both SWFs, the policy that targets risk reduction to the youngest quintile has a 
higher breakeven cost than does the uniform risk reduction. In contrast, the policy that targets risk 
reduction to the poorest quintile has a smaller breakeven cost than the uniform risk reduction under 
the utilitarian SWF, but a higher breakeven cost under the ex post prioritarian SWF. The poorest 
quintile experiences a smaller than average gain in wellbeing from risk reduction, but the ex post 
prioritarian SWF assigns sufficient priority to this quintile to offset the difference in wellbeing 
compared with a uniform risk reduction. 
These simulations show that the use of alternative evaluation methods, whether BCA or a specific 
SWF, can have a dramatic effect on the relative social value of reducing risk to individuals with 
different characteristics. The SVRR is increasing with income (and associated life expectancy) under 
BCA and the utilitarian SWF; the effect is much larger under BCA. In contrast, SVRR can increase or 
decrease with income under the ex ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs, depending on the degree of 
inequality aversion. All of the benchmark SWFs produce a larger SVRR for younger than older 
individuals in the simulations; this contrasts with BCA, which yields an SVRR that rises over younger 
ages then falls over older ages for some income quintiles. The ex post prioritarian SWF gives more 
priority to the young than does the ex ante prioritarian SWF in the simulations, though as described 




In this section we consider two extensions. The first is the use of SWFs that are not additively 
separable across individuals, which can exhibit catastrophe aversion. The second is a more general 
model that includes health and nonfatal health risks. 
7.6.1. Catastrophe aversion and nonseparable SWFs  
Hazards that lead to mass casualties, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, and 
other natural disasters, airliner crashes, and terrorist attacks, are often perceived to be of greater 
social concern than hazards that produce an equal or even greater number of deaths that occur in 
separate incidents, such as traffic crashes and ambient air pollution. Arguably, resistance to nuclear 
power plants and acceptance of coal-fired alternatives is rationalized by the perceived chance of a 
catastrophic loss of life in a nuclear accident as opposed to the routine mortality toll from fine-
particulate air pollution. 
Catastrophe aversion is defined as the preference for a higher probability of a smaller number of 
deaths over a lower probability of a larger number of deaths, holding the expected number of deaths 
constant. Keeney (1980) showed that, when risks are independent, catastrophe aversion conflicts 
with a preference for risk equity, defined as greater equality among individuals’ risks. To illustrate, 
consider a population of N people, each facing independent mortality probability pi. If the individual 
risks are all equal to 1/N, the expected number of deaths is one. Because the individuals’ risks are 
equal the risk distribution is perfectly equitable. Alternatively, if individuals 1 and 2 each face a risk of 
1/2 and all the others face zero risk, the expected number of deaths is also 1. This distribution is less 
equitable, because two people face higher risk than everyone else. The actual number of deaths can 
be very different: in the first case, it can be any number between 0 and N; in the second case, any 
number between 0 and 2. Catastrophe aversion implies a preference for the second risk over the 
first, which conflicts with a preference for risk equity. 
Adler et al. (2014) and Rheinberger and Treich (2017) generalized Keeney’s definition of catastrophe 
aversion; they define it as a preference for any mean-preserving contraction16 in the probability 
distribution of the number of fatalities. When risks are independent, a pure transfer of risk from one 
individual to another that decreases the difference between them increases risk equity and yields a 
mean-preserving spread in the distribution of fatalities, i.e., it makes the risk more catastrophic. 
Hence the conflict between catastrophe aversion and a preference for risk equity also exists under 
 
16 A mean-preserving contraction shifts probability away from the tails of a distribution without changing the 
mean. A mean-preserving spread shifts probability toward the tails. 
22 
 
this more general definition of catastrophic risk. When risks are dependent (before or after the risk 
transfer) and there are more than two people in the population, the relationship between risk equity 
and catastrophic risks is more complicated because a risk transfer can affect the correlation of risks 
within the population (Bernard et al. 2017). 
Rheinberger and Treich (2017) reviewed the empirical literature and found that catastrophe aversion 
is supported less often than not, perhaps because of a greater concern for risk equity. Another 
rationale for preferring a more-catastrophic risk is common-fate preference. As Schelling (1968) 
observed, a family may prefer to travel together on a single airliner rather than traveling on separate 
flights; traveling separately reduces the chance of a catastrophe in which the entire family dies but 
increases the chance of losing at least one family member, leaving the survivors to grieve. 
Of the evaluation frameworks evaluated to this point, BCA and the ex ante prioritarian SWF prefer 
policies in which risk is distributed more equally, and the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs are 
insensitive to how individual risks are distributed. This implies that, when risks are independent, BCA 
and the ex ante prioritarian SWF exhibit catastrophe acceptance and the utilitarian and ex post 
prioritarian SWFs exhibit catastrophe neutrality. In contrast, when risks are dependent the link 
between a preference for risk equity and catastrophe acceptance need not hold. For example, all 
four evaluation frameworks (BCA, the utilitarian, ex ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs) are 
indifferent between the case in which there is a 1/N chance that all N (identical) members of a 
population will die (with a complementary chance that all survive) and the case in which one of the N 
members to be selected at random will die for sure. In both cases, every individual faces a 1/N 
chance of death. 
The utilitarian, ex ante and ex post prioritarian SWFs are each defined as sums over individuals; this 
implies the evaluation is unaffected by any correlation or dependence between individuals’ 
outcomes. That is, the effect on social welfare of whether an individual survives or dies is the same 
regardless of whether other individuals survive or die. Other SWFs can account for such dependence. 
For example, the ex post transformed utilitarian and ex post transformed prioritarian SWFs are 
sensitive to dependence among individuals’ outcomes.  
These SWFs are obtained by introducing a strictly increasing function h(∙) that transforms each 
possible social outcome and calculating the expected value of the transformed outcomes. For the 
single-period model defined in Section 7.3, the ex post transformed utilitarian SWF is given by 
 𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑈 = ∑ 𝜋𝑠ℎ[∑ {𝑙𝑖
𝑠𝑢(𝑐𝑖) + (1 − 𝑙𝑖
𝑠)𝑣(𝑐𝑖)}𝑖 ]𝑠       (7.6) 
and the ex post transformed prioritarian SWF is given by 
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 𝑆𝐸𝑃𝑇𝑃 = ∑ 𝜋𝑠ℎ[∑ 𝑔{𝑙𝑖
𝑠𝑢(𝑐𝑖) + (1 − 𝑙𝑖
𝑠)𝑣(𝑐𝑖)}𝑖 ]𝑠 .     (7.7) 
As shown by Adler et al. (2014), these SWFs exhibit catastrophe aversion if and only if the 
transformation function h is concave. The intuition is that introducing a concave h is like introducing 
risk aversion over the evaluation of the possible outcomes. This implies the ex post transformed 
utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs prefer policies that are associated with a mean-contracting spread of 
the evaluation of the outcomes, e.g., a less-catastrophic risk. The utilitarian SWF (equation (7.3)) 
calculates the expected value of the sum of individuals’ utilities in each state. In contrast, the ex post 
transformed utilitarian SWF (equation (7.6)) calculates the expected value of this sum transformed 
by the function h. Analogously, the ex post prioritarian SWF (equation (7.4)) calculates the expected 
value of the sum of individuals’ utilities transformed by the function g. The ex post transformed 
prioritarian SWF (equation (7.7)) calculates the expected value of this sum transformed by the 
function h. 
An important special case of the transformation function h is Fleurbaey’s (2010) equally distributed 
equivalent (EDE).17 For any distribution of wellbeing in a population, the equally distributed 
equivalent is the level of individual wellbeing that, if held by everyone in a population, would yield 
the same social welfare. For the utilitarian SWF, the equally distributed equivalent is the average 
utility in the population and the transformation function hEDE is the identity function. Hence the ex 
post transformed utilitarian SWF using hEDE is catastrophe neutral. For the prioritarian SWF, the 





1 ] where ui is the wellbeing of individual i. Because g 
is concave, its inverse g-1 and hence hEDE are convex. This implies that ex post transformed 
prioritarianism using hEDE is catastrophe accepting. The intuition is that a more catastrophic situation 
is also more equitable ex post in the sense that more people live or die together, which is socially 
valued under this SWF. 
7.6.2. Health 
In the single-period model defined in Section 7.2, the effect of health is implicit; the utility of 
surviving the current period u(c) depends on the individual’s uncertain future health, longevity, 
income, and other factors. This model can be adapted to incorporate the effects of health and the 
possibility of suffering nonfatal illness or injury. In this section, we first examine the effect of future 
health on the social value of reducing current-period mortality risk.18 Second, we generalize the 
 
17 EDE is discussed by Adler (chapter 2, this volume). Ferranna and Fleurbaey (chapter 8) compare ex ante, ex 
post, and expected EDE prioritarianism in the context of climate policy. 
18 Here we depart from the assumption that the utility function u(c) is identical across individuals.  
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single-period model to include the possibility an individual may suffer an illness or injury that 
diminishes her health and may prove fatal. In this richer model, the set of possible actions is broader 
than for fatal risks. In addition to reducing the probability of suffering the condition, one can 
potentially reduce its severity or its lethality. We examine the social value of each of these actions 
under BCA and the benchmark SWFs, and how they depend on the baseline risk of illness, its severity, 
and the probability it is fatal. 
In the single-period model introduced in Section 7.2, utility conditional on surviving the current 
period u(c) can be interpreted as the certainty-equivalent utility conditional on survival, which 
depends on the individual’s lottery over future health prospects. Define ‘better future health’ as any 
change in this lottery that increases its certainty equivalent u(c) and hence increases the utility of 
survival. Better health increases SVRR under the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs but it can 
increase or decrease SVRR under the ex ante prioritarian SWF and BCA, as summarized in the last 
column of Table 7.1. Moreover, comparing two individuals who are identical except that one has 
better future health than the other, the ex post and ex ante prioritarian SWFs give relatively greater 
priority to reducing mortality risk for the individual with worse future health than does the utilitarian 
SWF. This result parallels the finding that the two prioritarian SWFs give priority to younger 
individuals, discussed in Section 7.4.1. 
Recall the SVRR under the utilitarian SWF is u(ci) – v(ci) and the SVRR under the ex post prioritarian 
SWF is g[u(ci)] – g[v(ci)]. In both cases, increasing utility conditional on survival u(ci) while holding 
constant the bequest v(ci) increases the SVRR. For the ex ante prioritarian SWF, the SVRR is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1i i i i i ig p u c p v c u c v c    + − −    . The second term (in brackets) is the SVRR under the 
utilitarian SWF (which is increasing in u(ci)) but the first term is decreasing in u(ci). If the 
transformation function g is sufficiently concave, the decrease in the first term can more than offset 
the increase in the second term so that the SVRR decreases with future health. For BCA, if (as is 
plausible) better health increases the marginal utility of wealth conditional on survival, the 
corresponding increase in the denominator of equation (7.2) can more than offset the increase in 
utility (the numerator), decreasing VSL. 
Under both the ex post and ex ante prioritarian SWFs, the ratio of the SVRR for someone with worse 
future health to the SVRR for an otherwise identical individual with better future health is larger than 
the corresponding ratio under the utilitarian SWF. That is, although the utilitarian and ex post 
prioritarian SWFs give priority to reducing risk to an individual with better future health (all else 
equal), the ex post prioritarian SWF gives less priority to such an individual. The ex ante prioritarian 
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SWF also gives less weight to such an individual, and can even favor reducing mortality risk to the 
individual with worse future health.  
As shown in Table 7.1, the effects of health on SVRR differ from the effects of both baseline risk and 
income. Neither VSL nor the SVRR under any of the benchmark SWFs can be equal across individuals 
differing in baseline risk, wealth, and health. 
To capture the possibility of illness or injury that may prove fatal, consider the single-period model 
developed by Rheinberger et al. (2016). An individual faces a probability p of illness. Conditional on 
illness, mortality risk is q.19 If ill, health deteriorates by a fraction h defined such that h = 0 
corresponds to full health and h = 1 to a health state as bad as dead (h is limited to the interval 
between 0 and 1). Utility depends on wealth c; the utility of a bequest is v(c) and the utility of survival 
equals (1 – h) u(c) + v(c).20 As in the standard model for mortality risk (equation (7.1)), we assume 
survival is preferred to death (u(c) > 0), the marginal utility of wealth conditional on survival is 
greater than the marginal utility of a bequest (u’(c) > 0), the marginal utility of a bequest is non-
negative (v’(c) ≥ 0), and the individual is averse to financial risk conditional on survival and on death 
(u”(c) ≤ 0 and v”(c) ≤ 0).  
Individual expected utility 
𝑈 = (1 − 𝑝)[𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑐)] + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)[(1 − ℎ)𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑐)] + 𝑝𝑞𝑣(𝑐) 
    = [1 − 𝑝(𝑞 + ℎ − 𝑞ℎ)]𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑐).      (7.8) 
One implication of this specification is that the marginal utility of wealth decreases as the health 
deterioration increases; this is often but not always assumed. This model is most naturally 
interpreted as a model of chronic illness because the individual cannot recover. It provides a model 
for acute illness if the utility if ill is interpreted as expected future lifetime utility conditional on 
becoming ill in the current period and recovering. Nonfatal health conditions can be represented by 
setting lethality q = 0. Note that the roles of lethality q and health deterioration h are symmetric; 
they appear in the last expression of equation (7.8) only in the term (q + h – q h). This has 
implications that are addressed below. 
 
19 Rheinerger et al. (2016) denote the probability of illness by q and the conditional mortality risk by p. 
20 Note that u(c) is the difference in utility between survival in full health and death. This differs from the model 
for mortality risk (equation (7.1)), in which u(c) is the utility of wealth conditional on survival. This specification 
is convenient for representing ill health as a fractional deterioration toward a health state as bad as dead. 
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Decreases in any of the three parameters (risk of illness p, severity h, and lethality q) increase 
expected utility. We describe the marginal value of decreases in each of these parameters (and of an 
increase in wealth c) under BCA and under the three benchmark SWFs. We then describe how these 
marginal values depend on the values of the other parameters (e.g., how the value of reducing the 
risk of an illness depends on its severity and lethality). Finally, we compare the relative social value of 
decreases in each parameter. Derivations are reported by Hammitt (2020). 
Under BCA, the social value of a marginal improvement in any dimension of the health risk equals the 
individual’s WTP for that improvement. By analogy to VSL, this value can be normalized to a one-unit 
change and reported as a value per statistical case. Rheinberger et al. (2016) derive the marginal 
WTP for prevention (reducing p), treatment (reducing q), and palliative care (reducing h). They show 
that marginal WTP for each of these improvements is positive and evaluate its dependence on the 
values of the parameter itself and of the other parameters. These results are summarized in Table 
7.4. WTP for an improvement in each dimension is increasing in wealth. Higher baseline risk (larger p) 
increases WTP for prevention (that reduces p), treatment (that reduces q), and care (that reduces h). 
Greater lethality (larger q) increases WTP for prevention (that reduces p) and treatment (that 
reduces q) but has an ambiguous effect on WTP for care (that reduces h). Greater severity (larger h) 
increases WTP for prevention (that reduces p) and care (that reduces h) but has an ambiguous effect 
on WTP for treatment (that reduces q).  
The social value of a decrease in baseline risk, lethality, or severity for an individual is defined as the 
rate of increase of social welfare resulting from a decrease in the corresponding parameter, i.e., the 
negative of the partial derivative of social welfare with respect to that parameter. Similarly, the social 
value of an increase in an individual’s wealth is the partial derivative of social welfare with respect to 
the individual’s wealth. These definitions are analogous to the definition of the social value of risk 
reduction in the case of mortality.  
Under the utilitarian SWF, social welfare is the sum of each individual’s expected utility (equation 
(7.8)). The contribution to social welfare of a single individual21 
𝑉𝑈 = 𝑈 = [1 − 𝑝(𝑞 + ℎ − 𝑞ℎ)]𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑐).       (7.9) 






, where  = p, q, or h. A decrease in 
baseline risk, lethality, or severity increases individual expected utility, and so the social value of a 
 
21 We omit individual subscripts for simplicity. 
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decrease in each of these dimensions is positive. The sensitivity of the social values to the parameter 
values are summarized in Table 7.4.  
The social value of an improvement (reduction) in baseline risk p, lethality q, and severity h is 
independent of the value of that parameter and is increasing in wealth. An increase in baseline risk p 
increases the social value of both treatment (reducing lethality q) and care (reducing severity h). The 
intuition is that, the more likely the individual is to become sick, the more likely it is that she will 
benefit from a reduction in lethality or severity. An increase in either lethality or severity decreases 
the social value of reducing the other, because it makes it less likely the individual will benefit from 
that reduction. 
Under the ex ante prioritarian SWF, social welfare is the sum of each individual’s expected utility U 
transformed by an increasing, concave function g. The contribution to social welfare of a single 
individual 
𝑉𝐸𝐴𝑃 = 𝑔[𝑈] = 𝑔{[1 − 𝑝(𝑞 + ℎ − 𝑞ℎ)]𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑐)}.      (7.10) 






, i.e., the social value 
of reducing that parameter under the utilitarian SWF multiplied by a priority factor that is equal to 
the slope of the transformation function g evaluated at the individual’s expected utility. Under this 
SWF, many of the effects are ambiguous because a change in a parameter can increase the social 
value of improving the lottery under the utilitarian SWF and at the same time increase the 
individual’s expected utility, decreasing priority to the individual. The effects of an increase in wealth 
on the social values of prevention, treatment, and care are ambiguous for this reason. The sign of the 
effect depends on the concavity of the function g: if the function is nearly linear, the effects go in the 
same direction as those under the utilitarian SWF; if it is sharply concave, the directions of the effects 
can be reversed.  
One effect that is unambiguous under the ex ante prioritarian SWF is that an increase in baseline risk 
p increases the social value of all three actions: prevention, treatment, and care. Although the social 
value of prevention under the utilitarian SWF is independent of baseline risk, an increase in risk 
decreases expected utility and hence increases the priority given to the individual under the ex ante 
prioritarian SWF. Because of the symmetry of lethality and health in the model, their effects are 
symmetric: an increase in either parameter increases the social value of reducing that parameter but 
has an ambiguous effect on the social value of reducing the other parameter. The difference from 
the results under the utilitarian SWF is that an increase in lethality or severity decreases expected 
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utility and increases priority to the individual. If the function g is sufficiently concave, the increase in 
social priority can more than offset the decreased gain in expected utility. 
Under the ex post prioritarian SWF, social welfare is the sum of each individual’s expected 
transformed utility. The contribution to social welfare of a single individual 
𝑉𝐸𝑃𝑃 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑔[𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑐)] + 𝑝(1 − 𝑞)𝑔[(1 − ℎ)𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝑐)] + 𝑝𝑞𝑔[𝑣(𝑐)] (7.11) 
and the social value of a reduction in parameter  is given by −
𝜕𝑉𝐸𝑃𝑃
𝑑𝜃
. Results are almost identical to 
those under the utilitarian SWF, with the major exception that the effect of an increase in wealth on 
the social value of prevention, treatment, and care is ambiguous rather than positive; the social 
values of these changes can decrease if the function g is sufficiently concave. The only other 
difference from the results under the utilitarian SWF is that an increase in severity h increases the 
social value of care (that reduces h) while it has no effect under the utilitarian SWF; in contrast, an 
increase in lethality has no effect on the social value of treatment (that reduces q) under both the ex 
post prioritarian and utilitarian SWFs. This result breaks the symmetry of the effects of severity h and 
lethality q seen under the utilitarian and ex ante prioritarian SWFs. The reason is that the two 
parameters do not enter the ex post prioritarian SWF (equation (7.11)) in a symmetric fashion. 
Severity h is a parameter of utility conditional on illness, so it enters as part of the argument of the 
transformation function g, specifically as g[(1 – h) u(c) + v(c)]. In contrast, lethality q is a probability 
and so it never appears in the argument of g. 
Comparison of the relative social values of reducing each of the three dimensions of health risk 
reveals that results are identical for BCA, the utilitarian and the ex ante prioritarian SWF. This follows 
because the social value of reducing each parameter under BCA equals the social value under the 
utilitarian SWF divided by the expected marginal utility of wealth, and the social value under the ex 
ante prioritarian SWF equals the social value under the utilitarian SWF multiplied by the slope of the 
transformation function g evaluated at the individual’s expected utility. Hence if the social value of 
reducing one parameter is larger than the social value of reducing another under the utilitarian SWF, 
the same is true under BCA and the ex ante prioritarian SWF. 
Because of the symmetry of the roles of lethality q and health deterioration h in the model (except 
under the ex post prioritarian SWF), the relative social values of treatment (to reduce q) and care (to 
reduce h) is determined by their relative magnitudes. Under BCA, the utilitarian SWF and the ex ante 
prioritarian SWF, the marginal social value of decreasing one of these parameters is always greater 
for the larger of the two parameters. That is, treatment (to reduce q) has a higher social value than 
care (to reduce h) if and only if q > h.  
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The social value of prevention (to reduce p) is larger than the social value of treatment (to reduce q) 
if and only if 
ℎ
1−ℎ
> 𝑝 − 𝑞. This condition is satisfied for diseases that are uncommon and lethal (for 
which p < q). For diseases that are rarely fatal (q ≈ 0), the condition is satisfied only if health 
deterioration is large compared with baseline risk; for common, mild, nonfatal illnesses, the social 
value of treatment can exceed that of prevention. The social value of prevention is larger than that of 
care (to reduce h) if and only if 
𝑞
1−𝑞
> 𝑝 − ℎ. This condition is satisfied for diseases that are 
uncommon and severe (for which p < h), and for highly lethal diseases (with q ≈ 1). For common, 
mild, nonfatal illnesses, the social value of care can exceed that of prevention. 
Under the ex post prioritarian SWF, the social value of treatment (decreasing lethality q) exceeds the 
social value of palliative care (decreasing health deterioration h) if q ≥ h. The social value of 
prevention (decreasing risk p) is greater than that of treatment (decreasing lethality q) if baseline risk 
p is near zero or health deterioration h is near one, i.e., for very rare or very severe disease. If 
lethality q and health deterioration h are both small, and risk p is not too small, then treatment has a 
larger social value than prevention. Prevention (to reduce risk) has a larger social value than care (to 
reduce severity) if h is small and q is larger than p or if h and q are large and p is small. Care has a 
larger social value than prevention if the disease is rarely fatal (q ≈ 0) and if health deterioration is 
smaller than baseline risk. 
In summary, in the case of fatal risk, better health conditional on survival increases SVRR under the 
utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs but can increase or decrease SVRR under the ex ante 
prioritarian SWF and BCA. In the case of more general health risks, the social value of an 
improvement in any of the three dimensions of health risk (baseline risk, lethality and severity of 
condition) is positive under BCA and the three benchmark SWFs. The sensitivities of the social values 
of risk reduction to changes in parameters differ substantially across the evaluation methods. One 
general result is that the social values are all increasing in wealth under BCA and the utilitarian SWF, 
but can increase, decrease, or be unaffected by wealth under the ex ante and ex post prioritarian 
SWFs. Another result is that the social value of prevention is larger when the health condition is more 
lethal or more severe; it is also larger when the baseline risk is higher under BCA and the ex ante 
prioritarian SWF, but is unaffected by baseline risk under the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian 
SWFs. 
7.7. Conclusion 
Concern about how to value reductions in mortality risk to people of different ages, incomes, and 
other characteristics has been a perennial issue in evaluation of environmental, health, and safety 
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policies. Typically, these policies have been evaluated using benefit-cost analysis and the value of 
reducing mortality risk is quantified as a value per statistical life (VSL). Analyses within a national 
population generally use a common VSL, independent of individual characteristics. In contrast, 
evaluation of medical and public-health interventions such as vaccination often use a constant value 
per unit increase in life expectancy, i.e., a constant value per life year or per life year adjusted for 
health (such as quality-adjusted or disability-adjusted life years).22 Obviously the two approaches are 
mutually inconsistent as the gain in life expectancy associated with a reduction in current-period 
mortality risk is proportional to life expectancy conditional on surviving the current period, which 
typically decreases with age. 
The use of social-welfare functions may help to defuse this tension. An important reason for the use 
of a constant value, either per expected life saved or per expected life year gained, is a desire to treat 
individuals equitably, perhaps equally. Conventional BCA attempts to separate evaluation of 
efficiency and equity, where efficiency is defined by the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test: a policy is 
efficient if the individuals who benefit from the policy could hypothetically compensate the 
individuals harmed by the policy with money, so that everyone would prefer the policy change plus 
compensation to the status quo. Recognizing that this compensation is hypothetical and is typically 
not made, it is conventional to supplement BCA (or at least to recommend it be supplemented) with 
an analysis of the distributional effects. The notion is that decision makers can choose policies 
recognizing both efficiency and distributional effects and make appropriate tradeoffs between these 
dimensions.  
Unlike conventional BCA, social-welfare functions can explicitly incorporate concerns for distribution 
together with concerns for efficiency. In principle, there is no need, and perhaps no advantage, to 
supplement an SWF analysis with a distributional analysis. Agreement on an appropriate SWF 
(including the functional form and parameter values), or at least agreement on a limited set of SWFs 
and parameter values, might reduce some of the tension about balancing effects on efficiency and 
equity. Use of an SWF requires choice of an interpersonally comparable measure of wellbeing, which 
is not required for BCA. 
The simulations reported in Section 7.5 suggest that differences in the social value of reducing risk to 
individuals with different incomes (and associated baseline mortality risks) are much smaller under 
any of the benchmark social-welfare functions than they are under BCA. Plausible SWFs treat 
individuals with different incomes more similarly than does BCA and for this reason may be perceived 
 
22 These analyses are often framed as cost-effectiveness analyses, where the health effect is valued in terms of 
the expected increase in quality-adjusted life years (or some other measure of health and longevity). 
31 
 
as more equitable. In contrast, the effect of differences in age can be smaller or larger under the 
benchmark SWFs than under BCA.  If differences in the social value of risk reduction are justified by a 
particular model of equity that is embedded in the chosen SWF, they may be more acceptable to 
decision makers and the public than the differences that arise under BCA. 
To determine whether the use of SWFs in evaluation of fatality risk regulations will help to better 
inform policy choice, much work remains to be done. Incorporating distributional effects in policy 
analysis requires more information on how policy effects are distributed than is necessary for BCA. In 
particular, information about how costs (reductions in disposable income) are distributed in a 
population is not needed for BCA but can be critical when applying an SWF (or conducting a 
distributional analysis). Because costs often appear in the form of increases in taxes or product 
prices, or decreases in wages, their incidence depends on how people respond to these market 
changes and can be difficult to estimate. Moreover, under prioritarian SWFs, the evaluation depends 
on history; the priority given to different individuals depends on their lifetime wellbeing, which 
depends on their wellbeing in previous periods. Collecting and organizing the information needed to 
adequately represent the distribution of lifetime wellbeing and its relationship to the distribution of 
possible consequences is a challenging topic for future work. 
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Table 7.1. Effects of baseline risk, wealth, and health on SVRR in the single-period model 
 Mortality risk Wealth Health 
BCA + + +/- 
Utilitarian SWF 0 + + 
Ex ante prioritarian SWF + +/- +/- 
Ex post prioritarian SWF 0 +/- + 
Note: Symbols describe the sign of the effect of an increase in the column parameter on 
the social value of a marginal decrease in the row parameter. Symbols denote increase (+), 
decrease (-), no effect (0), ambiguous effect (+/-). An effect is ambiguous if it depends on 
parameter values; the effect of wealth on SVRR for the two prioritarian SWFs is negative if 







Table 7.2. Effects of income and baseline risk on SVRR in the multi-period model 








BCA Past period: Independent 
Current period: Increasing 
Future period: Increasing 
Increasing Current period: Decreasing 
Future period:  Increasing 
 
Ambiguous 
Utilitarian  Past period: Independent 
Current period: Increasing 
Future period: Increasing 
Increasing Current period: Independent 
Future period: Increasing 
Increasing 
 
Ex ante prioritarian  Past period:  Decreasing 
Current period: Ambiguous 
Future period: Ambiguous 
Ambiguous Current period: Decreasing 
Future period: Ambiguous 
Ambiguous  
Ex post prioritarian  Past period: Decreasing 
Current period: Increasing 
Future period: Increasing 
Ambiguous Current period: Independent 
Future period:  Increasing 
Increasing 







Table 7.3. Breakeven average cost ($) for policy that reduces average annual mortality risk by 1/100,000  
Policy BCA Utilitarian Ex post prioritarian 
Uniform risk reduction    
   Uniform cost  91 48 78 
   Cost proportional to income 91 77 159 
Risk reduction for youngest quintile    
   Uniform cost  132 71 178 
   Cost proportional to income 132 108 360 
Risk reduction for poorest quintile    
   Uniform cost  15 32 98 
   Cost proportional to income 15 51 201 







Table 7.4. Social value of reducing alternative dimensions of health risk 
 Parameter decreased Incidence (p) Lethality (q) Severity (h) Wealth (c) 
BCA Prevention (p) + + + + 
 Lethality (q) + + +/- + 
 Severity (h) + +/- + + 
Utilitarian SWF Prevention (p) 0 + + + 
 Lethality (q) + 0 - + 
 Severity (h) + - 0 + 
Ex ante prioritarian SWF Prevention (p) + +/- +/- +/- 
 Lethality (q) + + +/- +/- 
 Severity (h) + +/- + +/- 
Ex post prioritarian SWF Prevention (p) 0 + + +/- 
 Lethality (q) + 0 - +/- 
 Severity (h) + - + +/- 
Note: Symbols describe the sign of the effect of an increase in the column parameter on the social value of a marginal decrease of 




















Figure 7.1. VSL is the slope of the indifference curve between the individual’s wealth and 
survival probability at her current position 
 
Indifference curve Wealth 







Figure 7.2. SVRR normalized for age and income (= 1 for age 60, median income) for BCA and alternative SWFs.   




































20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100









20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100









20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100












20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100






Figure 7.3. Ratio of SVRR at 90th percentile to 10th percentile of income under BCA and alternative SWFs. Left panel 
includes ratio of income at 90th to 10th percentile. 
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Figure 7.4. SVRR for median income normalized for age (= 1 for age 60) for BCA and alternative SWFs.  
Source: After Adler et al. (2021). 
 
 
 
